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1 Candidate Referents of the Concept
The concept of global supervenience is prominent in various philosophical
debates. Roughly, to say that one class of properties globally supervenes on
another one is to say that the distribution of the latter fully determines, or
fixes, the distribution of the latter. But ‘globally supervenes’ is not meant
to have all the connotations of ‘determines’ or ‘fixes’. For example, it does
not suggest that the relation is asymmetric, or that it is causal.
The concept is typically introduced by the slogan that A-properties glob-
ally supervene on B-properties if and only if no two worlds that differ with
respect to A-properties are alike with respect to their B-properties. That
slogan is not precise enough to pick out one relation among classes of prop-
erties. Three different relations have been put forward as candidates. They
are sometimes called “Weak Global Supervenience,” “Strong Global Super-
venience,” and “Intermediate Global Supervenience,” respectively.1 I will
argue that none of them has the features that we take global supervenience
to have.
Since the bearers of properties in A and B are typically not the worlds
themselves, but individuals in the domain of these worlds, the notion of two
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worlds being indiscernible with respect to such a class requires clarification.
At a first stab, w and w′ are A-indiscernible if and only if for every individual
x and property F ∈ A, x has F in w if and only if x has F in w′. On
this account, A-indiscernibility requires that the same individuals exist in
the two worlds, and accordingly, pairs of worlds with different domains can
never falsify global supervenience claims, even if the domains are of the same
size. Since such claims are about the distribution of properties, not about
the identity of individuals in different worlds, this account is inadequate.
Before stating an improved version, I want to illustrate why the notion
of indiscernibility is less straightforward than it might appear. Suppose that
in both world w and w′, there are exactly two individuals: a red cube and a
blue sphere in w, and a blue cube and a red sphere in w′. Are w and w′ alike
with respect to color-properties, and with respect to shape-properties? The
answers seem to depend on how we compare w and w′. If we pair up the two
cubes and the two spheres, respectively, for the purposes of comparison, we
will conclude that w and w′ are alike with respect to shapes, but different
with respect to colors. If, on the other hand, we pair up the two blue things
and the two red things, respectively, we will conclude that the worlds are
alike with respect to colors, but different with respect to shapes.
To introduce the candidates, this talk of pairing up individuals in different
worlds needs to be made more precise. Let Dw be the domain of individuals
of w. A function µ is a domain-isomorphism from world w to world w′
=df µ maps Dw one-one onto Dw′ .
2 For a class of properties A, µ is an A-
isomorphism between w and w′ = dfµ is a domain-isomorphism from w to
w′ and preserves every property in A, in the sense that for every X ∈ A and
every individual x in the domain of w, x has X in w if and only if µ(x) has
X in w′.3
Since I dispute that the proposed candidates deserve to be called “global
supervenience,” I use the more neutral terms “WGS,” “IGS,” and “SGS”
instead of “Weak,” “Intermediate,” and “Strong Global Supervenience,” re-
spectively. The three relations are defined as follows:
WGS A WGS B =df for all worlds w and w
′, if there is a B-isomorphism
between w and w′, there is also an A-isomorphism between w and w′.
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IGS A IGS B =df for all worlds w and w
′, if there is a B-isomorphism
between w and w′, some B-isomorphism between w and w′ is also an
A-isomorphism.
SGS A SGS B =df for all worlds w and w
′, every B-isomorphism between
w and w′ is also an A-isomorphism.
Some philosophers will insist that since ‘global supervenience’ is itself a term
of art, the question what relation it refers to is moot. The meaning of such
terms is to be stipulated, not analysed. If it matters in a given philosophical
context whether it is WGS, IGS, or SGS that is at issue, we should simply
make the appropriate stipulation. Against that view, I here assume that
‘global supervenience’ has acquired an established use in philosophical de-
bates. This use tells us something about what concept it expresses. It then
makes sense to ask whether it refers to the same relation as a given defined
term, say ‘IGS ’. (However, those who deny that this question makes sense
can read me as discussing features of various defined relations. Knowledge
of those features may inform the decision what relation should be invoked in
what philosophical context.) Of course, by claiming that each of the relations
defined above is distinct from global supervenience, I am not ruling out that
they may be otherwise theoretically useful.
The use of ‘global supervenience’ supplies conditions of adequacy for a
proposed candidate referent. The proposal must predict particular judg-
ments of global supervenience, and the referent must have the right logical
and structural features, such as transitivity. I argue that WGS and IGS are
not adequate in section 2, and that SGS is not adequate in section 3. In
section 4, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global
supervenience: some conditions of adequacy are jointly inconsistent. I con-
clude in section 5 by indicating how extant proposals might be improved
upon, while heeding the lesson of the puzzle that no candidate can be per-
fectly adequate.
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2 Why global supervenience is neither WGS
nor IGS
I start by briefly presenting a variation on an argument due to Shagrir [2002]
and Bennett [2004] to the effect that global supervenience is not WGS. Let
“Tallest” be the property of being the tallest giraffe if there is one, and
the number seven if there isn’t. Further, let “Smartest” be the property
of being the smartest animal if there is one, and the number nine if there
isn’t. In every world, Tallest and Smartest are had by exactly one individ-
ual. Hence there are {Tallest}-isomorphisms and {Smartest}-isomorphisms
between any worlds whose domains have the same cardinality. Thus {Tallest}
and {Smartest} bear WGS to every class of properties. In particular, they
bear it to each other. However, clearly they do not globally supervene on
each other, since the distribution of one does not fix the distribution of the
other.4
That {F} bears WGS to B could be paraphrased as follows: the distri-
bution of B fixes how many things have F . In contrast, global supervenience
is the far stronger claim that the distribution of B fixes the distribution of
F . This is one argument that shows that WGS is not global supervenience.
At the end of this section, I will present a second argument for the same con-
clusion. It will be a straightforward extension of my case against the claims
of IGS to be global supervenience, to which I now turn.
The relation IGS, introduced into the discussion by Shagrir [2002] and
Bennett [2004], holds between A and B if whenever there is a B-isomorphism
between w and w′, some B-isomorphism is also an A-isomorphism. It is
stronger than WGS, but weaker than SGS. IGS is a prima facie attractive
candidate for being the referent of the concept of global supervenience, since
it is not vulnerable to either the above objection against the candidacy of
WGS, or the objections against the candidacy of SGS to be discussed in the
next section.
Consider the above objection, in the version that invokes the classes
{Tallest} and {Smartest}. (The same response on behalf of IGS can be
given, mutatis mutandis, to other versions.) These classes of properties do
not bear IGS to each other. For there is a possible world w in which the
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tallest giraffe tw is also the smartest animal, and there is a domain-isomorphic
possible world w′ in which the tallest giraffe tw′ and the smartest animal sw′
are distinct. Clearly, there is a {Smartest}-isomorphism between w and
w′. Every {Smartest}-isomorphism maps tw to sw′ , while every {Tallest}-
isomorphism maps tw to tw′ . Since tw′ and sw′ are distinct, there is no
{Smartest}-isomorphism that is also a {Tallest}-isomorphism between w and
w′. Hence we get the desired result, which we note for future reference:
1) It is not the case that {Tallest} IGS {Smartest}.
Thus IGS avoids the problem for WGS. Nor is it beset by the problem that
SGS faces, to be discussed in the next section. So far, so good for IGS.5
However, I now argue that the candidacy of IGS faces serious problems of
its own.
It is part of the inferential role of the concept of global supervenience that
it stands for a relation that is transitive, monotonic, and “accumulative” in
the sense defined below. (For simplicity, I sometimes omit the qualification
‘global’, which is intended unless indicated otherwise.)
Transitivity If A supervenes on B and B supervenes on C, then A super-
venes on C.6
Unless Transitivity holds, we cannot conclude, for example, that the bio-
logical properties supervene on the physical ones from the premises that
the biological properties supervene on the chemical and the chemical on the
physical ones.
Monotonicity If A supervenes on a subclass B of B′, then it also supervenes
on B′ itself.
Unless Monotonicity holds, we cannot conclude that the chemical properties
supervene on the class of all physical properties from the premise that they
supervene on some class of physical properties.
Accumulativity If A and C each supervene on B, then A ∪ C supervenes
on B.
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Unless Accumulativity holds, we cannot conclude that all properties super-
vene on physical properties from the premises that the mental properties
supervene and that the non-mental properties supervene.
The relation IGS is neither transitive, nor monotonic, nor accumulative.
If ‘supervenes’ is replaced by ‘bears IGS ’, each of the three statements above
becomes false. I will obtain counterexamples to all of them by instantiating
A with {Tallest}, B with {Self-Identity}, B′ with {Self-Identity, Smartest},
and C with {Smartest}.
Together with 1) above, the following two claims entail that IGS is not
transitive:
2) {Tallest} IGS {Self-Identity}.
3) {Self-Identity} IGS {Smartest}.
Self-Identity is the property that everything has in every world in which it
exists. To prove 2), suppose there is a {Self-Identity}-isomorphism µ between
w and w′. Define µT as follows: if x is the unique individual tw which has
Tallest in w, µT (x) is the unique individual tw′ which has Tallest in w
′; if
x is µ−1(tw′), then µT (x) = µ(tw); and µT (x) = µ(x) if x is distinct from
either tw or µ
−1(tw′). Then µT is a {Self-Identity}-isomorphism which also
preserves {Tallest}, which establishes 2).
3) follows from the observations that every {Smartest}-isomorphism is
a domain-isomorphism, and every domain-isomorphism is a {Self-Identity}-
isomorphism. 2), 3), and 1) show that IGS is not transitive.
A counterexample to the monotonicity of IGS is provided by 2) together
with 4):
4) It is not the case that {Tallest} IGS {Smartest, Self-Identity}.
As in the argument for 1), we consider a world w where the same individual
has Tallest and Smartest, and a world w′ where these properties are had
by distinct individuals. 4) then follows from the observation that while there
is a {Tallest}-isomorphism between w and w′, no domain-isomorphism will
preserve {Tallest, Smartest, Self-Identity}.
Finally, 2), 5), and 6) together entail that IGS is not accumulative:
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5) {Smartest} IGS {Self-Identity}.
6) It is not the case that {Smartest, Tallest} IGS {Self-Identity}.
If we replace ‘Tallest’ in the proof of 2) with ‘Smartest’, we obtain a proof
of 5). Like 4), 6) can be established by the same type of argument as 1) and
4).
Since it it is neither transitive nor monotonic nor accumulative, IGS lacks
three formal properties needed to account for the inferential role of the con-
cept of global supervenience. Thus even though it avoids the objections
mounted against the candidacy of WGS and SGS, IGS is not global super-
venience.
As I announced above, the type of argument deployed here can be used
to undermine the credentials of WGS as a supervenience relation even fur-
ther. To be sure, it is straightforward to prove that WGS is transitive and
monotonic. But WGS is not accumulative, the following triple being a coun-
terexample.
7) {Smartest} WGS {Smartest}.
8) {Tallest} WGS {Smartest}.
9) It is not the case that {Tallest, Smartest} WGS {Smartest}.
7) obviously follows from the definition of WGS, and 8) was established in
the first paragraph of this section. To see why 9) holds, recall that the
argument for 1) shows that there are worlds w and w′ between which there is
a {Smartest}-isomorphism, but no {Tallest, Smartest}-isomorphism. Hence
WGS is not accumulative, and definitely is not global supervenience.
3 Why global supervenience is not SGS
The relation SGS does not face any of the objections raised against WGS or
IGS as explications of global supervenience. It is easily seen to be transitive,
monotonic, and accumulative, and unlike WGS, it is not too weak. However,
it can be argued that SGS is stronger than global supervenience.
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Bennett [2004] put the objection along the following lines: SGS is incom-
patible with so-called “intraworld variation” of individuals. Global superve-
nience, in contrast, allows that individuals differ in their A-properties but
not their B-properties, while ruling out that worlds differ in the former but
not the latter. That is just the respect in which the global variety is different
from non-global, or individual supervenience. Bennett [2004, p. 521] writes
that “everyone has always taken global supervenience to allow intraworld
variation; that is one of its standardly recognized ... features.” Here I want
to present a version of that objection that I find particularly compelling.
To falsify the claim that A globally supervenes on B, what is required
is a pair of possible worlds with the same pattern of distribution of B and
different such patterns of A. If no two worlds share the pattern of distribution
of B, there can be no such pair, and then any class A globally supervenes on
B—B is a global supervenience base for everything.
In the terminology used here, to say that no two possible worlds share the
pattern of distribution of B is to say that there is no B-isomorphism between
any w and w′, or that no worlds w and w′ are B-isomorphic. Thus it is a
further principle of adequacy for an explication of global supervenience that
it vindicates the following principle:
FPP If no two possible worlds are B-isomorphic, then every class of prop-
erties globally supervenes on B.
I choose to call this principle “FPP” or “Finest Partition Principle” because
it can be paraphrased as follows: if a class of properties induces a maximally
fine partition on the space of possible worlds, then it is a supervenience base
for everything.
WGS satisfies FPP: if there is no B-isomorphism between any w and
w′, the material conditional ‘if there is a B-isomorphism, then there is an
A-isomorphism’ is true because its antecedent is false.7 Mutatis mutandis,
the same argument shows that IGS satisfies FPP. However, we cannot prove
that SGS satisfies FPP. Indeed, given fairly modest assumption about what
the modal facts are, we can show that it does not.
Let FUND be a class of fundamental properties such that any two possible
worlds differ in how the members of FUND are distributed—no two worlds
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are FUND-isomorphic. Then SGS fails to satisfy FPP if there is a class
A that displays intraworld variation with respect to FUND. I now need to
clarify the pertinent notion of intraworld variation, and to argue that there
is such a class A.
Roughly, x and y make for intraworld variation in A if they differ in their
A-properties even though they do not only share their own FUND-properties,
but also their “world-perspective” (Sider [1999]) with respect to FUND. More
precisely, A displays intraworld variation with respect to FUND in w if and
only if there is a FUND-isomorphism from w to itself that does not preserve
A.8
How can we argue that there are classes that display intraworld variation
with respect to FUND? I offer three examples, each one relying on different
assumptions.
First, suppose that numbers neither instantiate fundamental properties
themselves, nor bear fundamental relations to anything that instantiates
them. Then no two numbers differ in FUND, and there is a FUND-isomorphism
from w to itself that maps the number seven to the number nine, and vice
versa (we may assume that it maps every concrete thing to itself). Then a
property like primeness, which is had by seven but not by nine, does not bear
SGS to FUND.
For a second example, suppose that the members of FUND obey some
combinatorial principle, as a consequence of which certain symmetrical dis-
tributions are possible. There may be reflection symmetry along a spatial
axis, or temporal translation symmetry, as in a world of two-way eternal
recurrence. If w is such a world, there are distinct individuals x and y and
a FUND-isomorphism µ from w to itself such that µ(x) = y. Thus any A
that differs between x and y fails to bear SGS to FUND. For instance, if A
contains a hæcceitistic property only had by x or y, it does not bear SGS to
FUND.
Third, assume that all possible worlds, or at least all possible worlds we
are quantifying over, have an atomic mereology. Let PS include all intrin-
sic properties that can only be had by mereological simples, and intrinsic
relations in which only simples can stand. For instance, PS may inlude the
properties of being an electron or a positron, or conjunctive properties like
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having unit negative charge and being simple, or having a mass of 1 gram
and being simple. Then it is a substantive question whether all classes of
properties globally supervene on PS. (Bells and whistles aside, it is the
question whether Humean supervenience holds [Lewis, 1986].) If there is no
PS-isomorphism between any two worlds, then surely PS is a global super-
venience base for everything. But consider a domain-isomorphism µ from w
to itself that maps every simple to itself, but maps the fusion of simples x
and y to the fusion of simples x, y, and z. Clearly, µ preserves PS, but does
not preserve the property of having two simple parts, as well as many other
properties. Trivially, then, it is not the case that every class of properties
bears SGS to PS.
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Each one of these examples, designed to show that SGS fails to satisfy
FPP, relies on some assumptions about what properties there are, and what
the modal facts are. Even though these assumptions are perhaps more con-
troversial than those used in exposing inadequacies in WGS and IGS, they
are still fairly modest. In any case, the satisfaction of a principle like FPP
should not be hostage to their falsity.
4 A Puzzle About Global Supervenience
To sum up the discussion so far: WGS is not accumulative, and {F} WGS
B only entails that the distribution of B fixes how many things are F , not
that it fixes how they are distributed. IGS is neither transitive, nor mono-
tonic, nor accumulative. SGS, given modest background assumption, does
not satisfy FPP. All three relations thus lack an important feature of global
supervenience.
Since none of the candidates proposed in the literature is adequate, the
question arises whether there is a candidate that satisfies all criteria? In
this section, I present a puzzle that suggests a negative answer. I motivate
further adequacy conditions, and argue that they cannot be jointly satisfied.
One condition is what I call “Permutation Invariance”:
Permutation Invariance For any permutation σ, if σA and σB exist, then
A globally supervenes on B if and only if σA globally supervenes on
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σB.
I will explain the crucial notion of a permutation below.
It is a further adequacy condition on an explication that it vindicates
our judgements about whether global supervenience holds or not between
between particular classes of properties. The puzzle then brings to the fore an
inconsistency between Permutation Invariance and pairs of such judgements,
given certain background assumptions about what the modal facts are. Using
schematic letters in the place of names for particular classes of properties,
the puzzle consists in the inconsistency of Permutation Invariance with the
following three claims (mnemonic for ‘permutation-related’, ‘supervenience’,
and ‘non-supervenience’, respectively):
P There is a permutation σ such that A′ = σA and B′ = σB.
S A globally supervenes on B.
N A′ does not globally supervene on B′.
Permutation Invariance and P entail that A globally supervenes on B if and
only if A′ globally supervenes on B′, which is inconsistent with S and N.
Below I present two instances of that puzzle: classes A, B, A′, and B′ of
which P, S, and N all seem to hold. It will turn out that denying P, which
does not concern global supervenience, is not promising. The upshot of the
puzzle will be that one of the three claims involving global supervenience has
to go.
Before defining the notion of a permutation used in stating Permutation
Invariance, I want to motivate that condition informally. It encapsulates a
claim about what is not relevant to whether A globally supervenes on B or
not. Heuristically, it is useful to ask what we need to know about modal space
in order to be able to know whether A globally supervenes on B. Clearly,
we need to know, for each world, the pattern in which A and B are dis-
tributed. This includes knowledge of facts of the following form, for every
world: there are individuals x1, ..., xn, properties and relations X1 ∈ A, ...,
Xm ∈ A, Y1 ∈ B, ..., Yk ∈ B such that Φ(x1, ..., xm, X1, ..., Xn, Y1, ..., Yp),
where Φ(x1, ..., xm, X1, ..., Xn, Y1, ..., Yp) is a conjunction of atomic formulas
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of the form Xixj...xk or Yixj...xk or negations thereof. More generally, we
need to know which infinitary versions of such pattern description are possi-
ble.
However, I claim that facts of that sort are all we need to know to answer
the question whether A globally supervenes on B. There are many other
things that we might know about A and B, but they are irrelevant to that
question. For example, it is irrelevant what expressions, if any, we use to
denote the properties in A and B, or whether the members of these classes
are natural or not. Moreover, it is irrelevant how any property F that is not
a member of either A or B is distributed relative to them.
The irrelevance of such factors reflects the fact that global supervenience
is a formal, broadly logical relation. It is this feature that enables global
supervenience to play a useful role in regimenting some parts of philosophical
discourse. Philosophers with widely differing metaphysical views about the
nature and abundance of properties can all help themselves to the idiom of
supervenience to express agreement, or to separate out disagreement about a
particular subject matter (consciousness, say) from disagreement about the
metaphysics of properties.10
Permutation Invariance is motivated by combining the claim that global
supervenience is a logical notion with the claim that logical notions are those
that are invariant under permutations of the domain. According to an influ-
ential view in the philosophy of logic, notably associated with Tarski [1986],
logical notions can be characterized as those that display such invariance.11
To support Permutation Invariance, I only need the weaker claim that in-
variance is a necessary condition, though possibly not sufficient condition for
logicality.
For present purposes, let a permutation σ be a function that permutes
the domain Dw of every possible world: σ maps 〈x,w〉 with x ∈ Dw to an
individual, in such a way that for a given world w, σw (defined by σw(x) =
σ(x,w)) is a one-one mapping from Dw onto itself.
A permutation can be extended to a (possibly partial) function on prop-
erties and classes of properties. If F is a property and σ a permutation, σF ,
if it exists, is the property that satisfies the following condition for every
world w: x has σF in w if and only if σ−1(x) has F in w. If A is a class of
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properties, σA, if it exists, is {σF : F ∈ A}.12
Permutation Invariance, as stated above, is the claim that a permutation
σ preserves both global supervenience and non-supervenience: A globally su-
pervenes on B if and only if σA globally supervenes on σB (for a permutation
σ for which σA and σB exist).13 Permutation Invariance is satisfied by WGS,
IGS, and SGS, the extant proposals for explicating global supervenience.14
An instance of the puzzle presents classes of properties A, B, A′, and B′
of which P, S, and N all hold. I propose two such instances.
4.1 A mathematical instance
Let “Seven” denote the property of being the number seven. As before,
Tallest is the property of being the tallest giraffe if there is one, and else the
number seven.15 Then each instance of the above triad appears to be true
(the subscript is mnemonic for ‘Arithmetical’):
PA There is a permutation σ such that {Seven} = σ{Tallest} and {Self-
Identity} = σ{Self-Identity}.
SA {Seven} globally supervenes on {Self-Identity}.
NA {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Self-Identity}.
Together with Permutation Invariance, PA entails that {Seven} globally su-
pervene on {Self-Identity} if and only if {Tallest} does, which is inconsistent
with SA and NA.
PA relies only on the assumption that there is a unique number seven,
and that it exists necessarily. Define σ(x) to be the number seven if x has
Tallest in w, to be the individual which has Tallest if x is the number seven,
and to be x in all other cases. The function thus defined is a permutation,
{Seven} = σ{Tallest} and {Self-Identity} = σ{Self-Identity}.
There is a strong prima facie case for SA. While it is perhaps not a
paradigm of a supervenience claim, it follows from a widely accepted prin-
ciple: that what is necessary supervenes on anything. Seven is a necessary
property in the following sense: if something has it, it has it necessarily,
and if something lacks it, it lacks it necessarily. In general, mathematical
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properties are necessary, and thus supervene on anything. It is partly be-
cause of this feature that many philosophers deploy supervenience in their
explication of physicalism. Such philosophers typically take physicalism to
be compatible with the existence of non-contingent entities, such as numbers
and other abstracta. An explication of the view as the claim that everything
supervenes on physical properties shares this compatibility.
There is also a strong prima facie claim for NA. Intuitively, the dis-
tribution of self-identity does not uniquely fix the distribution of Tallest:
knowing which things are self-identical does not enable us to know which
giraffe is the tallest in a world. To offer a different argument for the same
conclusion: {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Smartest}: there are
possible worlds that are alike with respect to relative smartness of animals,
but different with respect to relative heights of giraffes. Likewise, {Tallest}
does not globally supervene on {Smartest, Self-Identity}. By monotonicity,
it follows that {Tallest} does not globally supervene on {Self-Identity}.
Which one of Permutation Invariance, PA, SA, and NA should we give
up to restore consistency and retain a useful notion of global supervenience?
It would be no good to give up PA, even for a philosopher with heterodox
views about the modal status of mathematics. For the consistent use of the
concept of global supervenience should not be hostage to such views. In my
view, NA is likewise non-negotiable. A relation that holds between {Tallest}
and {Self-Identity}, or indeed {Tallest} and the empty class, is far too weak
to serve as the referent of our concept of global supervenience. The choice
is thus between Permutation Invariance and SA. Before discussing candidate
explications that give up one or the other of those in the next section, I
present a second instance, which shows that the puzzle does not only arise
in connection with mathematical properties.
4.2 A mereological instance
For every determinate m of mass, there is a property mS of having m and
being mereologically simple. For every spatiotemporal relation d, there is
a relation dS that individuals bear to each other if and only if they bear
d to each other and are all mereologically simple. Let MS include mS and
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dS, for every determinate m of mass and every spatiotemporal relation d.
Further, let “Supermass” be the property of being the individual with the
second-largest mass, if there is one, and the number nine otherwise.16 Finally,
let “Supercharge” be the property of being the individual with the highest
positive charge, if there is one, and the number eleven otherwise. Perhaps
“Supercharge” is had by the mereological fusion of all positively charged
atomic individuals.
Again, we obtain instances of P, S, and N above that appear to be true
(the subscript is mnemonic for “Mass” or “Mereological”):
PM There is a permutation σ such that {Supercharge} = σ{Supermass} and
MS = σMS.
SM {Supermass} globally supervenes on MS.
NM {Supercharge} does not globally supervene on MS.
Together with Permutation Invariance, PM entails that {Supermass} globally
supervenes on {Self-Identity} if and only if {Supercharge} does, which is
inconsistent with SM and NM .
Assume that in every world, neither the individual with the second-largest
mass nor the one with the largest positive charge are mereologically simple,
and that the numbers nine and eleven do not have a mass, nor stand in
spatiotemporal relations. Then the permutation σ that swaps the individuals
with Supermass and Supercharge and leaves everything else alone is such that
{Supercharge} = σ{Supermass} and MS = σMS.17 Hence PM holds.
There is a strong prima facie case for SM , if we suppose that every world
has an atomic mereology (I return to this supposition below). Mass is addi-
tive: the mass of an individual is the sum of the masses of its non-overlapping
parts. The distribution of mass among the mereologically simple individuals
thus fixes, or determines, the distribution of mass among all individuals.18
There is also a strong prima facie case for NM . The class MS does not
include determinates of positive charge. Presumably, positive charge can vary
independently from mass. Hence the distribution of MS does not determine
the distribution of positive charge, and neither of Supercharge.
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Again, we face the question which one of the four incompatible claims
we should give up. PM is safe, given how Supermass and Supercharge are
defined. NM , like NA in the mathematical instance, seems non-negotiable. As
before, the choice is thus between Permutation Invariance and the instance
of S.
Before proceeding, I need to comment on the controversial supposition
under which SM was argued for: that every world has an atomic mereol-
ogy. The supposition is essential to the argument. If some worlds have a
non-atomic, or “gunky” mereology, SM will fail. For then two worlds may
differ in how mass is distributed, while having the same distribution of MS
simply because nothing in them instantiates any member of MS. Can we
therefore respond to the present instance of the puzzle by denying that ev-
ery world has an atomic mereology? In my view, such a response would
be unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First, because the use of the concept of
global supervenience should not be hostage to substantive possibility claims
of that kind. Second, because the present instance of the puzzle could ar-
guably be modified to accommodate gunky mereology. We could replace MS
by a class M ′S that includes not only properties and relations had by simples,
but also by things that are relatively small, say under one cubic-meter in
volume. Then we arguably still get three claims that are jointly inconsistent
with Permutation Invariance: there is a permutation σ that maps M ′S to
itself and {Supermass} to {Supercharge}; {Supermass} globally supervenes
on M ′S; and {Supercharge} does not globally supervene on M ′S. The class
of properties chosen for a modified argument would have to be tailored to
a particular background view about what the modal facts are. But I am
confident that given a view about these facts, an instance of the puzzle can
be constructed. Thus while SM may well have to be given up in the end, the
puzzle is not dissolved by rejecting the controversial supposition used in my
particular way of setting it up.
5 Better candidate explications?
I have tried to motivate various criteria of adequacy for an explication of
global supervenience, and argued that they cannot all be satisfied. If I am
16
right, there is no perfectly adequate candidate. Still, we may ask whether
there are explications that are more adequate than WGS, IGS, and SGS. In
this section, I introduce new candidates and briefly mention some of their
strengths and weaknesses. However, a full discussion of their respective mer-
its is beyond the scope of this paper.
As noted, SGS is stronger than global supervenience. Still, its definition
can be modified in such a way as to produce weaker candidates. Its logical
form is that of a universal quantification: for all functions µ and worlds w and
w′, if µ is a B-isomorphism between w and w′, it is also an A-isomorphism
between w and w′. There is a well-known method for modifying universally
quantified claims that are stronger than we want: restricting the domain of
quantification, either explicitly or implicitly. Since logical features do not
depend on what the domain is, they are unaffected by such a modification.
Relations defined by restricting the domain of functions quantified over are
weaker than SGS, but crucially, they are still transitive, monotonic, and
accumulative.19
In section 3, I showed that SGS does not satisfy FPP: that no two worlds
are B-isomorphic does not entail that B is an SGS -base for everything. The
failure of that entailment was established by appeal to domain-isomorphisms
from a world to itself. This suggest a distinctness constraint on the domain-
isomorphisms quantified over:
SGSD A TSGS B =df for all distinct worlds w and w
′, every B-isomorphism
between w and w′ is also an A-isomorphism.
If no two worlds are B-isomorphic, then there is no B-isomorphism between
distinct worlds that could fail to be an A-isomorphism, and hence every class
A bears SGSD to B. SGSD thus satisfies FPP.
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SGS not only fails to satisfy FPP, but also SA and SM . {Seven} does
not bear SGS to {Self-Identity}, as can be shown by appeal to domain-
isomorphisms that do not map numbers to themselves. Likewise, {Supermass}
does not bear SGS toMS, as can be shown by appeal to domain-isomorphisms
under which the image of a fusion of parts is not the fusion of the images
of these parts. This suggests a preservation constraint : that the domain-
isomorphism preserve the relations of membership and parthood, i.e. that
17
x ∈ y in w if and only if µ(x) ∈ µ(y) in w′, and x is a part of y in w if and
only if µ(x) is a part of µ(y) in w′:
SGSP A SGSP B =df for all worlds w and w
′, every B-isomorphism be-
tween w and w′ that preserves membership and parthood is also an
A-isomorphism.
Given the assumptions mentioned in the last section (atomic mereology, ad-
ditivity of mass), SGSP satisfies SM ; and given a set-theoretic reduction of
numbers, it satisfies SA. Like SGS, it satisfies NA and NM . The price it has
to pay is the violation of Permutation Invariance.
Adding both the distinctness and the preservation constraint yields the
following proposal:
SGSDP A SGSDP B =df for all distinct worlds w and w
′, everyB-isomorphism
between w and w′ that preserves membership and parthood is also an
A-isomorphism.
For each of the three relations SGSD, SGSP , and SGSDP , defending its
credentials as an explication of global supervenience would involve two chal-
lenges.
A defense of SGSD would need to explain that giving up SA and SM is
the best response to the puzzle of the last section, and that the distinctness
constraint is not ad hoc.
A defense of SGSP would need to explain that giving up Permutation
Invariance by privileging relations such as membership and parthood is the
best response to the puzzle, and that FPP is negotiable.
A defense of SGSDP would need to explain that giving up Permutation
Invariance is the best response to the puzzle, and that the distinctness con-
straint is not ad hoc.
However, an assesssment of the respective merits of these three relations
is beyond the scope of this article, as is a discussion of further ways in which
one might modify extant proposals.21
In conclusion: The concept of global supervenience may be more prob-
lematic, and less straightforwardly understood, than we might have thought,
and it may not give us all we wanted. Nonetheless, I do not wish to suggest
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that it is not a valuable tool. It may have its limitations, but so do all tools.
The better we know them, the more appropriate our use of it will be.
Notes
1This is the terminology used in Bennett and McLaughlin [2005]. The distinction
between the weak and the strong variety is made in McLaughlin [1996], Stalnaker [1996],
McLaughlin [1997], and Sider [1999]. IGS was introduced into the discussion by Shagrir
[2002] and Bennett [2004].
Weak Global Supervenience and Strong Global Supervenience ought not to be confused
with Weak Supervenience and Strong Supervenience (Kim [1984] and Kim [1987]), which
are species of individual, not global supervenience.
2Paull and Sider [1992, (D1), Appendix] defined indiscernibility with respect to a class
of properties in terms of a bijection between the domains of worlds.
3For relations, the second condition reads as follows: 〈x1, ..., xn〉 stand in n-place rela-
tion R in w if and only if 〈f(x1), ..., f(xn)〉 stand in R in w′. Since the issues I discuss arise
in the same way in the monadic and the polyadic case, I often speak only of properties.
4The counterexample that both Shagrir [2002] and Bennett [2004] offer (independently
of each other) involves permutations of mental properties among the individuals in a
physical duplicate world.
5Shagrir [2002] and Bennett [2004] both argue that in some sense it fails to be a genuine
determination relation. However, these arguments do not directly bear on the question
whether IGS is global supervenience, for these authors do not take it for granted that
global supervenience is a genuine determination relation.
6For example, Bennett and McLaughlin [2005, section 3.2] assert that supervenience
(in general, not just global supervenience) is transitive.
Strictly speaking, Transitivity, like Monotonicity and Accumulativity below, is uni-
versally quantified with respect to classes of properties A, B, and C.
7Obviously, a relation is said to satisfy FPP if it satisfies the open sentence that results
when we replace ‘globally supervenes’ by ‘bears R’ in the above.
8To put things differently: A SGS B rules out that world-mates differ in their A-
properties even though they agree on all properties and relations definable from those in
B. (For x and y share all the properties that are definable from B in the relevant way if and
only if there is a B-isomorphism that maps x to y.) This is a consequence of the following
result due to Stalnaker [1996, p. 104-105]: if B* consists of the properties and relations
definable from B in an infinitary language with truth-functional operators, quantifiers,
and identity, then A SGS B is equivalent to the claim that A strongly supervenes on B*.
(A strongly supervenes on B if and only if x in w and x′ in w′ are B-duplicates, they are
also A-duplicates.)
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9I am setting aside mereological nihilism here, and assume that there are composite
objects.
Certain supervenience theses about composition cannot be discussed in the framework
adopted here. Someone may wish to deny that the polyadic relation C of composing
something globally supervenes on PS . Given the definition of isomorphisms, however,
there will not be any PS-isomorphisms between worlds in which PS is distributed in the
same way, but which differ in how many composite objects there are. I cannot discuss this
problem here, however.
10Sometimes logic is taken to be concerned with language and concepts, while meta-
physics is concerned with the world. This is not the contrast that I have in mind when I
call supervenience a “broadly logical” notion. Of course, supervenience relates classes of
properties, not symbols. It is logical roughly in the sense that it is concerned with form
or structure: it depends merely on the pattern of distribution of the properties in the
relevant classes, not on their intrinsic nature.
11The idea was inspired by Felix Klein’s Erlangen Program, which characterized the
subject matter of geometrical theories by the class of mappings under which its concepts
are invariant. The permutation invariance condition for logical concepts was advocated
by Mautner [1946] and then by Tarski in a lecture in 1966 from which the posthumous
Tarski [1986] is derived. It was subsequently elaborated and defended in Sher [1991].
12In general, we should not assume that there is no more than one property satisfying
that condition, since properties may be more fine-grained than intensions. However, in
the context of a discussion of supervenience, such an assumption is harmless. Properties
that share their intension surely do not differ in what supervenience claims are true about
them. Hence we can work with a properties that are no more fine-grained than intensions.
13It can be shown that there is a permutation σ such that A′ = σA and B′ = σB if and
only if a pattern description Φ (of the form given above) is realized by a possible world
just in case Φ′ is realized by a possible world (where Φ′ results from Φ by replacing A
with A′ and B with B′). Hence Permutation Invariance entails that if exactly the same
pattern description are possible for 〈A,B〉 and 〈A′, B′〉, then A globally supervenes on B
if and only if A′ globally supervenes on B′.
14This is straightforwardly verified by invoking the following fact: given a permutation σ
and worlds w and w′, * defined by µ* = σw′◦µ◦σ−1w maps the class of domain-isomorphisms
from w to w′ one-one onto itself, in such a way that for any class of properties A, µ preserves
A if and only if µ* preserves σA.
15The argument would equally go through with Smartest instead of Tallest. Of course,
it is not crucial for the example that Tallest is had by the number seven in worlds where
there is no tallest giraffe. What matters is only that the property is had by exactly one
thing in each world.
16Given some assumptions, the individual with the largest mass in a world is always
that world itself; the distribution of the property of having the largest mass would then
not be very interesting. For that reason, I present an example using the second-largest
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mass.
17More formally, σ is defined as follows: σ(x,w) is i) the individual which has Super-
charge in w whenever x has Supermass in w, ii) the individual which has Supermass in w
whenever x has Supercharge in w, and iii) x if x has neither Supermass nor Supercharge
in w.
18I am assuming that any two worlds that agree on MS agree on which things have a
mereological fusion. I will not defend this assumption here, nor make it formally precise.
See also note 9.
19It is familiar that the class of worlds quantified over in global supervenience claims
need not always include all metaphysically possible worlds. Sometimes, only nomologically
possible worlds are considered, and sometimes only worlds with no alien fundamental
properties, as in David Lewis’s definitions of minimal materialism [Lewis, 1983] and of
Humean supervenience. But restrictions of that kind are not my topic here. Even given
such a class of worlds, there is the further question which isomorphisms between them are
relevant for the evaluation of a global supervenience claim.
20In contrast, inserting ‘distinct’ in the definitions of WGS and IGS does not remedy
their shortcomings. The relations thus defined do not have the same features as global
supervenience, for the arguments of section 2 apply against them as well as to their un-
modified cousins WGS and IGS.
21Examples of further modifications are provided by crossworld constraints on domain-
isomorphisms µ from w to w′, to the effect that if there is a unique y in w′ that stands
to x in a certain crossworld relation, e.g. identity across worlds or counterparthood, then
µ(x) = y.
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